As key agents of conflict management, political parties should play a critical role in peacebuilding.
Introduction
Political parties are essential components of representative democracy, and it is difficult to imagine how the governance of modern states could be accomplished without meaningful political parties. By organising voters, aggregating and articulating interests, crafting policy alternatives and providing the basis for coordinated electoral and legislative activity, political parties are not just central to representative government, but also to the process of democratic development in transitional democracies. 1. Parties perform a number of essential functions that make democracy possible. Ideally, they represent political constituencies and interests, recruit and socialise new candidates for office, set policymaking agendas, integrate disparate groups and individuals into the democratic process, and form the basis of stable political coalitions and hence governments. Collectively, this means that political parties are one of the primary avenues for building an accountable and responsive model of democracy.
Beyond these functional activities, parties also provide a number of deeper, systemic supports that help make democracy work effectively. For instance, they mediate between the demands of the citizenry and the actions of the government, aggregating the diverse demands of the electorate into coherent public policy, and making effective collective action possible within legislatures. Without the predictable voting coalitions that parliamentary parties provide, there would be chaos as legislative majorities shifted from issue to issue and vote to vote.
Yet in many countries, particularly post-conflict ones, political parties struggle to play these admittedly idealised roles. Instead, parties exhibit a range of pathologies that undercut their ability to deliver the kind of systemic benefits on which representative politics depends. In reality, parties in transitional environments are often poorly institutionalised or based around narrow personal, regional or ethnic ties, rather than reflecting society as a whole. They are typically organisationally thin, coming to life only at election time, with little in the way of a coherent ideology or policy agenda.
They are frequently unable to ensure disciplined collective action in parliament, with members shifting between parties. As a result, parties often struggle to manage social conflicts and fail to deliver public goods and promote development.
Parties and post-conflict governance
Political parties' importance is heightened in countries attempting to make the transition from the chaos of violent conflict to democratic government. In post-conflict or divided societies, ethnic and other communal identities are often a predominant social cleavage, providing a kind of social glue when other civic bonds have been destroyed. Those few civil society organisations that exist are often closely associated with conflict actors (e.g. ethnic associations, religious bodies, veterans groups, etc.), often through direct patron-client exchanges. As a result, politics tends to be both highly personalised and strongly identity-based around whatever cleavages -tribe, language, region or religion -are most salient. In such cases, the interaction between civil society, political parties and the electoral process can become highly fraught, as demonstrated in cases such as Kenya where flawed elections catalysed large-scale ethnic violence in 2007. 2 The recognition of such impediments to democratic development has spurred growing attention, both at the domestic and international level, on how more broad-based political parties can be sustained and developed in socially complex environments. Internationally, the response by Western governments to this problem has been a plethora of political party assistance programs which seek to help parties become stronger, more coherent and inclusive organisations -that is, more like the idealised view of how parties are supposed to operate. These programs have received considerable funding from donor agencies and generated a swathe of bodies devoted to political party assistance.
Post-conflict states such as Mozambique, Kosovo and Afghanistan have been the recipients of largescale party-building operations designed to transform former armed groups into electoral organisations which respect constitutional boundaries.
3. As a result of this increasing focus on parties at both the domestic and international level, the importance of political parties to post-conflict democracy receives more attention today than ever before. 4 But evaluations suggest that these assistance programs typically have a limited impact, rarely if ever transforming the fundamental organisational and operational characteristics of recipient parties. 5 . The indiscriminate way in which assistance is offered and the lack of any overarching consensus on what kinds of parties and party systems should be encouraged represents a particular weakness of contemporary party assistance. Post-conflict democracy promotion too often becomes hostage to facile ideas about the virtues of unconstrained party system development -a policy of 'let a thousand flowers bloom'. While superficially attractive, this has led to a proliferation of new parties in transitional democracies, often based around narrow identity criteria, and a dearth of the kind of broad-based, aggregative parties that, studies suggest, can bind together societies and promote economic development.
This disjuncture is even more striking, given the way political elites in conflict-prone countries which have not attracted international interventions have tended to deal with their own issues of internal party system development. In sharp contrast to international dictates, domestic elites frequently seek to limit party proliferation, combat sectarianism and regulate the way parties form, organise and compete. 6 Empirical studies on the relationship between political parties and country governance have buttressed these conclusions. The most sophisticated effort, by Kenneth Janda and Jin-Young Kwak, concluded that one-third to half of all the variation in governance outcomes between states could be explained by how competitive, aggregative and stable was their party system 13. Conversely, fragmented party systems seem debilitating for good governance: Powell's work on democratic durability suggests that the most favourable party system comprised a limited number of cohesive and broad-based parties, rather than many small, fragmented, personalised or ethnically based parties.
14 Public goods delivery is a key part of this story, with nationally focussed parties more likely to deliver classic public goods such as health services 15. Cross-nationally, an increase in the number of parties represented in the legislature leads to a higher spending by the government on subsidies and transfers but lower spending on public goods. 16 . A lack of nationalised parties can also be conflict-enhancing.
According to large-N research by Dawn Brancati, regional parties tend to increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favours certain groups over others, and mobilising groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism. Where political competition is diffused by multiparty competition across the political spectrum, with no central governing or opposition party to structure political choice, citizens and political elites alike have to adapt to the reality of fragmenting political interests or face repeated rounds of instability and governmental underperformance. 20 Regardless of sheer numbers, the presence of parties that are both institutionalised and programmatic seems to be particularly important for democracy work effectively, enabling politicians to make credible election promises and electorates to retrospectively punish those who fail to deliver. 21 . By mobilising the aggregate interests of individuals with similar preferences, such parties also facilitate collective action -one of the keys to both economic and political development, as it allows citizens to act collectively in defence of their joint interests and to retrospectively reward or punish governing parties accordingly. Where citizens have this ability, governments have greater incentives to pursue public policies in the public interest and also face greater political costs if they fail. 22 But while both political practitioners and political scientists agree on the virtues of stable and programmatic political parties for emerging and consolidated democracies alike, they offer surprisingly little advice as to how such party systems may be encouraged or promoted. There are several reasons for this. The role of international actors and development aid agencies is also important. While it is today widely accepted that stable democracy requires the development of a stable party system, there had in the past been resistance to the idea of direct international assistance to parties. Until recently, broader democracy and governance initiatives funded by development aid agencies often steered clear of working with parties, in part because of the overtly 'political' nature of such work, and also because aid agencies were often more comfortable dealing with civil society. But there has been a considerable shift in international practice in the past decade, with more and more governments and international organisations including political party strengthening in their development assistance programs. 24 If we know that they are desirable, the next question must surely be how stable and aggregative parties and party systems can be encouraged to develop. Clearly, forging a cohesive party system, particularly in societies riven by deep communal cleavages, is easier said than done. Nonetheless, domestic attempts to influence the development of parties via various kinds of institutional design have become relatively common in new democracies. The following section examines some of these domestic responses to the problem of party-building in conflict-prone societies.
Institutional Choices and Political Party Development
The most common means of influencing party system development in conflict-prone societies is to introduce regulations which govern their formation, registration and behaviour. Such regulations may require parties to demonstrate a cross-regional or nation-wide composition as a pre-condition for competing in elections. Some of the world's most important transitional states have introduced such measures in recent years. In Turkey, for example, parties must establish regional branches, hold regular conventions and field candidates in at least half of all provinces to be eligible to contest national elections. In Russia, one of Putin's first reforms required political parties to register regional branches in a majority of Russia's 89 regions. Nigeria, in a move followed by many other African countries, requires parties to display a 'federal character', and regularly bans parties that fail to meet this criterion. 25 . In Indonesia, the world's most populous emerging democracy and largest Muslim country, parties must establish an organisational network in two-thirds of the provinces across the archipelago, and in two-thirds of the municipalities within those provinces, before they can compete in elections, although with some exceptions. 26 . Such devices raise the costs of party organisation, erecting a steep barrier to any potential new entrants.
What is the effect of such schemes? The evidence to date is somewhat ambiguous, pointing to the utility of such mechanisms in achieving some goals -such as a more consolidated party system -but also their propensity for unintended consequences. Indonesia's mixture of regional (in Aceh) and national parties has worked relatively well, highlighting the reality that regional autonomy requires local electors to be able to vote for local parties. Johanna Birnir's analysis of Latin America's crossregional party registration rules found that nationally oriented parties often prospered at the expense of those representing geographically concentrated indigenous groups, suggesting that the exclusionary effects of such rules may outweigh any gains that result from reduction in party fragmentation 27 . In Africa, the most comprehensive study of this issue yet conducted found few clear impacts of ethnic party bans on either peace or democracy 28. In both regions, the claims that party engineering could promote better governance outcomes were found wanting.
In Asia, by contrast, party regulation appears to have been much more consequential. 29 . I have argued previously that political party engineering in Asia and the Pacific has helped to consolidate party systems and promote a degree of conflict management, but in doing so has also assisted larger incumbent parties at the expense of minority interests. 30 . In Indonesia, for instance, new party rules have deterred the emergence of ethno-regional parties and limited opportunities for secessionism and ethnic conflict. As Aspinall has noted, In Indonesia, the decision early in the democratic transition to disallow local political parties from contesting elections was, it now appears in retrospect, highly consequential. It meant that the elevated levels of ethnic identification in politics that accompanied the transition were not crystallised, captured, and perpetuated in political movements that themselves sought to seek state power. At the very least, the decision placed an additional layer of brokerage and negotiation between ethnic leaders and state institutions. Indonesia's national political parties, though derided as poorly institutionalised vehicles of oligarchic interest, have proven remarkably adept at encouraging cross-ethnic bargaining and in minimising the role of ethnicity in politics. 31. Despite its apparent success, the Indonesian experience has not so far inspired much in the way of emulation. One reason may be the heavy-handed nature of such reforms, which necessarily impinge on political freedom. In one sign of this, Fiji's military government recently issued a decree requiring parties to recruit at least 5000 registered members divided between the country's four geographic divisions, a move which may force some degree of multiethnic behaviour but which also raises huge barriers to democracy, requiring parties to enlist almost 10 per cent of the country's population as registered members. 
Party-building and international practice
In contrast to these kinds of devices, elections in which the international community is heavily involved -particularly those conducted under United Nations auspices -display few if any such incentives for political aggregation. Instead, they tend to favour simple models of proportional representation and unconstrained party formation, a combination which facilitates minority inclusion But, irrespective of these political strengths and weaknesses, in practice the adoption of PR systems for UN-administered elections has frequently been dictated more by technical concerns, such as the desire to avoid demarcating individual electoral districts and producing separate ballot papers, than deeper issues of political development. In war-torn environments, national PR systems are sometimes argued to be the only feasible way to hold credible elections. The reasons for this are essentially administrative in nature: national party-list systems enable a uniform national ballot to be used, do not require electoral districts to be demarcated and greatly simplify the process of voter registration, vote counting and the calculation of results. Problems of population displacement and the lack of accurate census data also work in favour of a proportional system with a single national constituency which does not tie voters to specific electoral districts.
40.
The problem with this approach is that such systems also have very specific political effects, particularly on a country's emerging party system. As one recent survey noted, nationwide PR is 'the most permissive system … politicians can join small parties, establish new ones, or split an existing one, safe in the knowledge that even a small percentage of the votes will bring some seats in the In Iraq, for this reason, international experts initially favoured an electoral system based around provincial boundaries. However, this would have entailed a lengthy national census. In the interests of time, it was therefore decided to fall back on a single, nationwide district elected by PR in which 1/275th of the vote was sufficient to gain a seat. While this doubtlessly facilitated the administration of the election itself, it also had the effect of fragmenting the legislature, marginalising numerically smaller groups such as the Sunni and doing nothing to prevent ethnic polarisation amongst the electorate. When combined with a presidential and quasi-federal system of government, the result was a proliferation of political veto-points which quickly led to deep problems of governability (stalemate, instability and balkanisation) and public policy (rent seeking, regional inequality and lack of public goods delivery) -all familiar and indeed predictable outcomes according to the political science literature. 43 In 2010, this system was replaced by a regional PR model along the lines of that initially recommended by external experts, enabling the resurgence of a nominally non-sectarian political party, Iraqiya, which included many Sunni politicians. 44 . But by then, the die had been largely cast:
most parties remained tied to ethnic and religious identities, with the Sunni-Shi'ite division the key political cleavage in Iraqi electoral politics. Compounding this problem was the powersharing arrangement between Iraq's two largest parties signed under US pressure in 2010, which rapidly degenerated into a bitter stand-off between the country's two most powerful politicians, prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and the leader of the Iraqiya bloc, Ayad Allawi. There is now a growing realisation that this ethicised political system was a repeat of mistakes made by US negotiators in Bosnia and elsewhere. 45. To quote Paul Salem of the Carnegie Endowment:
Because the U.S. is not familiar with deeply divided societies and is not familiar with power-sharing systems, I would say, it made many grave mistakes and made the situation much worse. In other words even in implementing a power-sharing system it didn't do it all the way and it didn't do it properly'. 46 .
In cases of international intervention, perhaps the worst decision in recent years was the choice of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) for parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. Under SNTV, each elector has one vote, there are multiple seats to be elected and the candidates with the highest number of votes fill these positions. As a result, the number of candidates a party nominates becomes a critical choice: too few, and parties miss out on valuable chances to pick up additional seats; too many, and they risk splitting their vote too thinly and losing winnable seats. By forcing candidates from the same party to compete against each other for the same pool of voters, SNTV encourages personalistic attributes to be emphasised over and above those of party identification. While Afghanistan's weak and fragmented parliament probably suits the interests of President Karzai, these pathologies also undercut the goal of building a stronger political system and encouraging cohesive national development. In a clan-based society such as Afghanistan, SNTV has made it much harder for a consolidated party system to develop. 47 These examples suggest that successful transitional elections need to encourage both inclusion but also a significant degree of geographic and personal accountability -such as by having members of parliament represent territorially defined districts, or at least by allowing voters to choose between candidates and not just parties. For this reason, 'mixed' systems which deliver both district accountability and minority representation have become increasingly popular in recent years.
However, as the experience in 2006 of high-profile conflict-zone elections held under mixed systems in cases as varied as the Democratic Republic of Congo (which resulted in a highly fragmented parliament) and the Palestinian National Authority (in which the system was designed to favour the incumbent Fatah party but instead resulted in a victory for Hammas) indicates, there are no panaceas.
Despite this, most post-conflict political settlements give the responsibility for such choices to parties rather than to voters, approximating the classic consociational models of European social democracies. 48 . This tendency has buttressed the normative preferences of the United Nations and The recent history of Iraq gives another example of the kind of impasse which can be created when an array of ethno-religious parties need to arrive at a consensus to enshrine a new government: simply put, they do not. Today, some local observers argue that Iraq is veering towards a 'Lebanonisation' of its political system, with power permanently distributed along strict ethnic and sectarian lines. For two governments in a row, the posts of president, premier and parliament speaker have been parcelled out to a Kurd, a Shiite and a Sunni, all with deputies drawn from the other two groups, a practice that now appears to have spilled over into civil service appointments and the security forces. 
Conclusion
Building aggregative parties in post-conflict environments is fraught with problems. Even with the best will in the world, it has often proved impossible for party-builders to construct multiethnic parties. Difficult trade-offs are ever-present, not least the collective action problems created when internal party leaders attempt to balance the need for party cohesion and unity with the need to appeal to a broad swathe of the electorate. Parties need to form around whichever issues are salient, and in war-torn societies it is hard to escape the logic pushing parties to follow 'conflict' cleavages, be they inter-ethnic, inter-religious or inter-regional. However, party institutionalisation in new democracies remains an elusive goal. 58 In terms of party systems, a relatively small number of broad-based, programmatic parties in which competition over the generation of public goods takes precedence over all other issues, need to be fostered and sustained. The natural tendency in post-conflict settings for a profusion of new parties representing different social cleavages should not be further exacerbated by permissive electoral laws.
Rather, international assistance should aim to foster a few large, inclusive parties with a broad support base which deliberately cut across, rather than reinforce, existing social cleavages.
And finally, as a complement to this focus on developing a small number of broad-based, programmatic parties, there should be much less focus from external assistance on promoting descriptive representation and minority rights than is accorded in both democratic theory and donor practice. Rather, promoting 'bridging' parties which aggregate diverse social cleavages should take precedence over other goals aimed at maximising the representation of all interests, worthy though these may be.
As should now be clear, there is a clear tension between these recommendations and the typical concerns of aid donor agencies and international organisations. While the comparative experience strongly suggests that programmatic, aggregative and institutionalised parties offer major benefits for all democracies, this is even more important in post-conflict ones. But, when it comes to international efforts at party-building in post-conflict democracies, these objectives often in practice take a back seat to more immediate concerns about administrative convenience, descriptive representation and tokenism. Unsurprisingly, the result has been immobilised parliaments, fragmented parties and chronically unstable governments.
